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Abstract 
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 created new possibilities for economic policy. 
Economic liberalization brought sustained, if unspectacular, growth that reversed the long 
decline in per capita incomes, but left its scars in much job shedding associated with business 
becoming internationally competitive. This accords with international evidence that trade 
liberalization takes time to realize positive employment effects. Disappointing employment 
growth in the face of an expanding labourforce fed rising unemployment. However, using 
poverty estimates from a combination of sources, this study demonstrates that poverty 
nevertheless declined quite substantially after the turn of the century. Poverty dominance testing 
shows this conclusion to be insensitive to the selection of poverty line or measure. But empirical 
analysis does not allow strong conclusions to be drawn on causal relationships between 
globalization and poverty trends. 
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A polarization measure and a bi-polarization index are used to investigate whether income or 
wages have become increasingly polarizing forces. The polarization measure shows a modest 
increase in income polarization between 1995 and 2000, but no clearly discernable trend in 
wage polarization for 1995-2004, although the trend at low levels of α  is consistent with an 
amplified impact of qualifications and skills on wages. Income polarization amongst blacks is 
the highest and has widened further. The bi-polarization index tracks divergence in incomes or 
the ‘vanishing middle-class’. Thus increased upward mobility of black workers in post-
apartheid South Africa may have dominated any bi-polarizing forces induced by globalization. 
This conjecture of two opposing forces is supported by a large increase in overall wage  
bi-polarization.  
In summary, South Africa experienced declining poverty, increasing inequality and polarization, 
and falling bi-polarization during the first post-transition decade. There were both winners and 
losers from liberalization. The triad of political, trade and financial liberalization has had 
dramatic effects on the domestic economy and society, although it is impossible to disentangle 
these effects empirically. The most important impact of re-integration was sustained economic 
growth, without which all South Africans would have been significantly worse off. The 
counterfactual to re-integration into the global economy is not a different distribution of income, 
but an economy with a different production capacity.   
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1 Introduction 
South Africa’s political transition culminated in 1994 with the holding of the country’s 
first democratic elections. This date can also be regarded as the turning point in South 
Africa’s re-integration into the world economy. Under apartheid, protectionism was first 
an activist industrial policy instrument and later a defence against growing international 
isolation. The political realities of the time constrained policy choice and prevented 
progress in the first hesitant moves to open up the South African economy. Whatever 
liberalization impetus existed was strongly countered by the effect of threatened 
sanctions against the apartheid state—later de facto financial sanctions—and the debt 
standstill of 1985. Within this constellation of political events, policymakers could do 
no more than accept the reality of a relatively closed economy and continue with the 
industrial policy stance of import substitution.  
Economic liberalization and South Africa’s full acceptance into the international fold 
brought new possibilities for economic policymaking. In the main, re-integration 
brought sustained, if unspectacular, growth that reversed the long decline in per capita 
incomes. The continuing economic upswing is already the longest sustained one in 
South Africa’s economic history. But economic performance has not been spectacular 
and the adjustment required by liberalization has left its scars in job shedding in much 
of industry—in order to become internationally competitive—and in mining, given 
rising mine wages and more recently a strengthening currency. This is in line with 
international evidence that the positive employment effects of trade liberalization take 
some time to be realized—although Rama (2003) contends that the initial loss of 
‘privileged’ employment in monopolistic and state-owned industries is eventually 
counteracted by new export jobs. Disappointing employment growth in the face of an 
expanding labourforce have fed a trend of rising unemployment rates in an economy 
with only a small informal sector and no safety net of subsistence farming. This implies 
that formal sector unemployment has become a major cause of poverty. 
The apparently adverse implications of such market-driven trends for the South African 
income distribution have been revealed in several recent studies. Using household 
survey data, Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2005) observe that the returns to 
human capital have collapsed in the post-transition period, while Hoogeven and Özler 
(2004) find that poverty has worsened substantially. However, both of these studies are 
based on the income and expenditure surveys (IES) of 1995 and 2000: surveys that are 
known to suffer from serious deficiencies in terms of reliability and comparability. 
Indeed, the massive income decline implied by a comparison of these surveys—about 
40 per cent in per capita terms in the first five years of the post-transition period—
contradicts the trend observed in the national accounts and is also greatly at odds with 
other data. For instance, government revenues from VAT, income tax and company tax 
increased in real terms by 19 per cent, 26 per cent and 33 per cent respectively over the 
measurement period. Few observers of the South African scene regard such large 
income declines as credible, thus raising the need for alternative data sources to be able 
to assess whether money-metric poverty and polarization have indeed increased. 
Given the known shortcomings of recently collected official datasets and the desire to 
evaluate poverty trends since the turn of the century, this study draws on an alternative 
source of data: the all media and products survey (AMPS). Evidence of a marked 
reduction in poverty during the second half of the first decade of democracy is 
presented, and largely attributed to the recent large-scale expansion of the social grants 
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system. Poverty dominance testing is used to show that the main conclusions reached 
are not sensitive to the selection of poverty line or poverty measure. However, a caveat 
applies when drawing inference regarding the link between globalization and poverty. 
No matter how well poverty is measured or how robust the findings are to the 
specification of a poverty line, empirical analysis does not allow one to draw strong 
conclusions on the role of globalization in determining the course of poverty. The 
reason for this is that it is extremely difficult to establish a causal relationship between 
globalization and changes in the income distribution. 
Survey data are also used to construct a polarization measure developed by Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray (2004) and a bi-polarization index developed by Wolfson (1994). This 
analysis investigates claims that income has become an increasingly important 
polarizing force in South African society, and is—to the best of our knowledge—the 
first of its kind in the South African context. Polarization measures are distinct from 
standard inequality indicators because they consider not only the spread of the income 
distribution, but also what Duclos and Échevin (2003) refer to as the ‘clustering of 
income around local poles’. Polarization is usually interpreted as a measure of political 
and social stability, an issue of particular importance in a newly democratized society. 
The intuition behind this interpretation is that the existence of individual incomes far 
from the mean will not fuel social and political action on its own. Some degree of 
association between groups of observations located far above and far below the mean is 
required to prompt collective behaviour. 
The paper continues with a brief review in section 2 of developments in trade and 
financial liberalization over the transition and post-transition period, proceeding to a 
discussion of the labour market implications of such changes. Section 3 turns to 
evaluating trends in poverty and inequality over the past decade, and speculates on how 
these could have been influenced by globalization. Section 4 concludes. 
2 A brief history of South Africa’s trade and financial liberalization: 1994-2005 
2.1 Trade liberalization 
Efforts to liberalize South Africa’s trade regime were first undertaken during the 1970s, 
following the release of the Reynders Commission Report. It was already recognized at 
that time that a more outwardly oriented strategy was superior to the import-substituting 
industrialization strategy that had been in place since as early as 1925 (Ball 2001: 7). 
However, the increasing political and economic isolation of the country prevented much 
progress with the envisioned shift towards greater openness until the early 1990s. The 
move towards liberalization gained steam with the negotiations conducted by the 
transition government through the mechanism of the National Economic Forum, as the 
prospect of reintegration into the global economy grew more real.  
When the new government took over in April 1994, the South Africa was emerging 
from the poorest decade of economic performance it had experienced during the post-
War period (Du Plessis and Smit 2005: 26). Decades of isolation and protectionist 
policy had left the country with a legacy of production inefficiency and a skewed 
economic structure that was also associated with South Africa’s notoriously severe 
racial inequality. Embarking on a programme of trade liberalization was therefore 
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viewed as not only symbolic of South Africa’s political transition but also as one of the 
key components of government’s strategy to kick-start economic growth. The 
enthusiasm of the new government with respect to making further progress in trade 
liberalization was evident when South Africa became a signatory to the Marrakech 
Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994. Government thus 
took its first major step towards reforming the trade regime, committing to an initial 
five-year phased programme for reducing and rationalizing the country’s complex and 
highly discretionary tariff structure. In terms of the agreement 10,000 tariff lines were to 
be decreased to 6,000, while tariff rates were to be standardized from more than 100 to 
only six, varying up to 30 per cent (Ball 2001: 8). Impressively, the largest tariff cuts 
were made in sectors that had previously enjoyed the most extensive protection, and 
South Africa’s tariff reduction programme was more ambitious than required by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). This policy stance is in line with government’s 1996 
GEAR framework, which set out an export-led growth strategy.  
Initially, substantial progress was made in simplifying the tariff structure. The number 
of tariff lines was cut by a third from the very high level of 12,500 between 1990 and 
1996, while the number of tariff rates was reduced from 200 to 49. The average tariff 
fell from 28 to 10 per cent during the same period, and the maximum tariff rate was cut 
to 61 per cent (Lewis 2001: 3). Since 1996, however, progress with liberalization has 
slowed: there have been small declines in the number of tariff bands and the level of the 
maximum tariff.1 Furthermore, there has been less progress since 1990 in reducing 
effective protection than has been the case with nominal protection, given South 
Africa’s tiered protection structure (i.e., high protection on consumer goods, moderate 
protection on intermediate goods, low protection on capital goods). In fact, research by 
Fedderke and Vaze (2001: 445) shows that half of South Africa’s output is produced in 
sectors where effective protection actually rose over the period 1994-98; by contrast, 
only 15 per cent of output is produced in sectors where effective protection had fallen 
by 1998 relative to pre-transition levels. Continuing high levels of effective protection 
imply that South Africa’s anti-export bias has not yet been eliminated.  
To evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on the South African economy—and in 
particular its impact on employment and distribution—at least three issues need to be 
examined: (i) changes in the volume of trade flows, (ii) changes in the composition of 
trade, and (iii) the impact of trade on growth. Trade flows have undoubtedly increased. 
Total trade (measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP) has risen throughout 
the post-transition period; by 2004, it stood at 54 per cent. This increase should be 
attributed not only to trade policy reform, but also to favourable world demand 
conditions and exchange rate depreciation - both factors that strongly influence South 
Africa’s export performance (Tsikata 1999). Manufacturing exports rose rapidly after 
1994, with the chemical, metal and machinery sectors showing the best performance 
within the sector (Lewis 2001: 7). Liberalization also caused the price of imports to fall 
as a result of continuing tariff reductions and the removal of sanctions, leading to 
                                                 
1  Bhorat, Lundall and Rospabe (2002: 3) suggest that this was because the dramatic initial cuts in trade 
protection were followed with ‘more careful and nuanced adjustments that needed to be made in more 
sensitive industry and product lines’. 
4 
greater import penetration.2 Consequently, both imports and exports increased after 
1994. On balance the growth impact of this increased trade was positive: net trade 
contributed 10 per cent of the rise in gross output between 1993 and 1997 (Edwards 
2001a: 478). However, in line with what appears to be a typical trade liberalization 
experience for developing countries, the bulk of the increase in South Africa’s gross 
output during this period was due to rising domestic final demand—particularly demand 
for manufactured goods (Lewis 2001: 10-12).  
Turning to the composition of South Africa’s trade, it is interesting to note that the 
country’s manufacturing exports are dominated by physical and human capital intensive 
goods, contrary to what one might expect given South Africa’s abundance of unskilled 
labour. The share of skill-intensive manufactures in total exports has grown since the 
early 1990s, from 49.5 per cent in 1992 to 58.5 per cent in 1999 (Lewis 2001: 13). 
However, this share stagnated from 1996 onwards, at least partly due to a shortage of 
skilled managerial and technical labour (ibid.: 14). By contrast, manufacturing exports 
intensive in unskilled labour and natural resources have fallen in importance over the 
same period; in 1999 the former amounted to only 6.8 per cent of total exports while the 
latter contributed 19.6 per cent (ibid.: 13). Against the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin 
trade models, trade liberalization has thus intensified the structural shift towards capital- 
and skill-intensive production in the South African economy. Labour market 
implications of the structural shift are discussed towards the end of this section. 
Next, the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is considered. Early 
international empirical studies arguing that trade is unambiguously good for growth 
have recently come under fire by authors including Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), for 
reasons including measurement difficulties. Another issue relevant to the interpretation 
of empirical work on the relationship between trade and growth is drawing the 
distinction between trade openness and trade reform. Greenaway, Morgan and Wright 
(2001) note that there is more solid empirical evidence of trade openness being 
beneficial for growth than there is for trade reform. Investigating the issue further, these 
authors report the existence of a robust J-curve relationship: trade reform is growth 
enhancing, but its benefits are not reaped immediately.  
2.2 Financial liberalization 
The South African government initiated financial liberalization following the release of 
the De Kock Commission reports (1978, 1985) that recommended a more market-
oriented monetary policy. However, liberalization efforts were dealt a temporary but 
severe blow in 1985, with the international debt standstill resulting in a sharp cut in net 
capital inflows. The scope for pro-liberalization policymaking only broadened again 
almost a decade later with the election of the ANC-led government in 1994. During this 
year the trend in private capital flows was reversed as investors responded euphorically 
to the peaceful transition to democracy, and the South African government was able to 
re-enter global financial markets with a bond issue of US$750 million (Cross 2003: 
104). These substantial capital inflows allowed government to increase both the Reserve 
                                                 
2 Accounting for 40 per cent of total imports in 2000, the largest import category remains metal 
products and machinery (Bell 2001: 12). This reflects South Africa’s continued reliance on imported 
intermediate inputs into capital-intensive production techniques. 
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Bank’s holdings of gold and foreign exchange—which had been run down to critical 
levels during the pre-election period—and to sustain a modest current account deficit. 
Such inflows created substantial leeway for making further progress in liberalizing the 
financial sector. In addition, a macroeconomic burden of high and variable inflation and 
substantial public debt provided government with an urgent financial liberalization 
imperative.  
During the years following 1985, government had issued a large number of foreign 
currency guarantees as a result of its lack of access to international capital markets: by 
March 1995 the net open forward position3 stood at US$28 billion (Cross 2003: 107). 
These high levels of public debt made the country vulnerable to currency attack and 
thus increased exchange rate risk. In March 1995 the financial rand system was 
abolished, ending the operation of a dual exchange rate mechanism. Foreign exchange 
flows linked to international transactions concerning assets in South Africa thus became 
available for reducing the Reserve Bank’s forward book. During the late 1990s, 
following harsh criticism by the IMF of the government’s intervention in the market 
through the forward book, the Reserve Bank decided to reduce the net open forward 
position to zero. Finally, in February 2004 the oversold forward book was closed out. 
Relaxation of exchange controls also brought benefits to the private sector. Capital 
controls on non-residents were effectively eliminated when the dual exchange rate 
system ended, and resident individuals and firms have been allowed to make 
increasingly large offshore investments since the mid 1990s. In addition, it was decided 
in 1995 that South African insurers, pension funds, unit trusts and fund managers could 
hold a limited proportion of their investments offshore. Collectively, these measures 
represent a large stride in the direction of capital account openness.  
The maintenance of net inflows on the capital account after 1994 allowed South Africa 
to maintain a modest current account deficit once again. They also allowed the Reserve 
Bank to replenish its store of foreign exchange reserves. Previously the absence of 
foreign capital had imposed a balance-of-payments constraint in terms of which the 
country was forced to run a current account surplus. Together with the high interest 
rates maintained during the last decade of apartheid, this had placed a limit on South 
Africa’s economic growth prospects. Aside from easing the balance-of-payments 
constraint, government was also able to promote growth through reducing interest rates. 
During the second half of the 1980s, the Reserve Bank had introduced money supply 
targets in an attempt to directly control spiralling inflation. However, use of this 
nominal anchor was unsuccessful in containing inflationary pressure: inflation figures 
remained double digits during the early 1990s. In 1998, the Reserve Bank replaced 
money supply targeting with an informal inflation targeting system. This system was 
formalized two years later, with national treasury setting an initial target band of 3-6 per 
cent. While the inflation rate has not always been kept strictly below the upper limit of 
the target range, it has been reduced significantly and has been maintained at stable and 
low levels for the past few years.  
                                                 
3  During the time of sanctions following 1985, South Africa’s access to international credit was cut off. 
The only way in which the government could raise credit was through providing forward cover to the 
private sector to protect its access to trade credits, hence the establishment of the forward book. The 
net open forward position equals the oversold forward book less the Reserve Bank’s net gold and 
foreign exchange reserves.  
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The gradualist approach adopted by the government in its financial liberalization 
programme appears to have paid off. Despite some exchange rate volatility, financial 
liberalization has progressed relatively smoothly and has not been accompanied by 
capital flight. The ANC government’s high prioritization of macroeconomic stability—
most strongly reflected in the GEAR policy framework—is arguably at least partly the 
reason for South Africa’s successful post-transition financial liberalization experience.4 
It has become conventional wisdom that financial liberalization improves economic 
growth prospects only if reforms are sequenced correctly—i.e., that macroeconomic 
stability is achieved before the financial sector is liberalized—and if complementary 
financial sector policies are in place (see, for instance, Eichengreen 2001, Nyawata and 
Bird 2003). The question of whether financial liberalization has indeed enhanced 
growth in South Africa, empirically speaking, is not easily answered. In the 
international literature, little conclusive support has been found for the robust growth-
enhancing impact of financial liberalization (Eichengreen 2001). Given the weakness of 
international conclusions on a growth-enhancing role for financial liberalization, 
additional less formal evidence on the impact of financial reform on South Africa’s 
growth prospects is presented. 
Analysing countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
Nyawata and Bird (2003: 14) argue that the available data do not support the hypothesis 
of a link between financial liberalization and growth. Their study indicates little change 
in saving or investment rates in South Africa during the second half of the 1990s; 
substantial post-transition investment inflows were largely offset by investment 
outflows of a similar size. Constituting 17.1 per cent of GDP, South Africa’s investment 
spending still remains low by world standards (Du Plessis and Smit 2005: 19-20). 
Indeed, it is true that many aspects of South Africa’s financial liberalization experience 
support Nyawata and Bird’s position. While one might expect the liberalization of the 
capital account to promote investor confidence in the long term, foreign direct 
investment levels thus far have remained disappointingly low. Portfolio flows have been 
large and positive at times, although highly volatile, resulting in large fluctuations in the 
exchange rate, the key price of an open economy. Indeed, a slew of recent international 
financial crises have demonstrated just how risky globalization can be for government’s 
efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability. On the other hand, it seems intuitive that 
recently lower interest rates, a stable low inflation rate, and improved availability of 
foreign capital have contributed positively to growth. In addition, Nyawata and Bird 
(2003: 29) show that some financial deepening has occurred over the past decade in 
South Africa. This has positive implications for long-term growth (Levine 1992, in 
Reinhart and Tokatlidis 2003). 
While empirical support for the growth-enhancing effects of financial liberalization 
remains tenuous, there is stronger evidence of a link between financial liberalization and 
two key macroeconomic aggregates in South Africa. Aron and Muelbauer (2000) find 
that financial liberalization in South Africa has been associated with large increases in 
the ratios of both private consumption and household debt to income. The literature 
often argues that financial liberalization reduces credit constraints when consumption-
smoothing households expect higher rates of future economic growth. However, Aron 
and Muelbauer point out that financial liberalization also increases household 
                                                 
4 Du Plessis and Smit (2005: 16) comment on what has been a ‘remarkable improvement in 
macroeconomic stability’ in South Africa over the past decade.  
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consumption and debt through its impact on mortgage markets. It does so by improving 
the availability of collateral-backed credit and by reducing the deposits required of first-
time homeowners. These factors result in young consumers spending more as a result of 
being required to save for fewer years to accumulate a housing deposit, and consumers 
who own houses spending more as a result of being able to borrow more in a liberalized 
market.  
2.3 The impact of globalization on employment 
The picture outlined above is one where both trade and financial liberalization appear to 
have positively—albeit modestly—influenced economic growth in South Africa. 
Averaging 3 per cent per year in the decade following 1994 (Du Plessis and Smit 
2005: 15), GDP growth has improved, implying that globalization has created some 
space for reducing unemployment. However, unemployment has not declined: by late 
2004, the unemployed accounted for 26.4 per cent of the labourforce according to the 
narrow definition of unemployment, and 41.3 per cent by the expanded definition.5 
These figures are substantially higher than the comparable ones for the mid 1990s. 
Attempting to determine the extent to which job growth has proven inadequate requires 
careful consideration of the issues surrounding different sources of employment data, 
since trends in employment figures differ widely depending on which source is used.  
The Statistics South Africa and South African Reserve Bank series of employment in 
non-agricultural sectors provide the most pessimistic trends, with the Reserve Bank 
suggesting that non-agricultural employment declined by 13 per cent over the period 
1994 to 2003 (South African Reserve Bank 2002 in Van der Berg 2004: 218). However, 
the series from which this estimate is derived has major deficiencies, including a major 
discontinuity in the middle of 2002. The downward trend in employment seems 
doubtful, particularly given the recent strengthening in economic performance.  
A second source of employment data comes from comparing employment figures in the 
October household surveys (OHS) and labourforce surveys (LFS) over the period 1995-
2004. However, there is also a discontinuity between these two series, with the LFS 
capturing more informal sector participants. Using these two series would over-estimate 
the growth in employment over the period: employment growth of 26 per cent is 
recorded over the period, as against real GDP growth of 31 per cent. This may be 
viewed as surprisingly positive employment performance in light of the modest 
economic growth rates observed during the second half of the 1990s. (For a more 
complete discussion of the choice between these alternative employment series, see 
inter alia, Bhorat 2003, 2004.)  
A third option is to accept the surveys as correct, but to take the position that the OHS 
and LFS are not comparable, i.e., to accept that part of the increase between the two 
series results from differences in methodology. To make them more comparable, the 
two series are spliced where they meet. The results of this exercise are displayed in 
Figure 1. Estimated employment growth is slower than in the previous case, at 23 per 
cent over 1995-2004, implying an average annual increase of 2.3 per cent per year. On 
 
                                                 
5  Own calculations based on the Labour Force Survey of September 2004. 
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the basis of the spliced employment series (which may be the most accurate set of 
estimates available), regression analysis yields a relatively high employment elasticity of 
economic growth of 0.83 over the same period. This is illustrated in Figure 2: observe 
how closely the spliced employment series tracks real GDP over the past decade.  
Figure 1 
Estimates of total employment, 1990-2004 
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Source: Van der Berg and Louw (2004) and own calculations based on OHS/LFS data for various years. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Real GDP and employment, 1995-2004 
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Source: South African Reserve Bank, OHS and LFS data for various years. 
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While it would seem that the ability of the economy to generate jobs is surprisingly 
positive and robust, no related discussion would be complete without considering the 
skills content of employment opportunities recently created and lost. It was pointed out 
earlier that there has been a skill bias in the structural change of the economy over the 
past ten years. As a result, jobs have been shed at the lower end of the skill spectrum, 
reflected in the decline of the share of employment of unskilled labour in the total from 
31 per cent in 1995 to 27 per cent in 2002. By contrast, the demand for skilled and 
semiskilled labour has risen, with the share of employment of each type of labour 
increasing by two percentage points over the same period6 (Bhorat 2004: 954). Thus, 
the jobs that have been created are largely located towards the upper end of the skill 
spectrum. Furthermore, the pace of job creation has not managed to keep up with the 
very rapid growth in the labourforce, as Figure 1 indicates. Five million individuals 
entered the labour market between 1995 and 2002,7 while only 1.6 million found 
employment. Modest employment growth of 16.75 per cent over the period is implied, 
contrasted with a much larger 52.38 per cent increase in the size of the labourforce 
(Bhorat 2004: 945-8). This has compounded an unemployment problem that was 
already large at the time of political transition. Clearly employment growth has proven 
insufficient to absorb more of the unemployed into the formal labour market, and to 
shift them from traditional (low wage) to modern (high wage) sectors—analogous to 
Arthur Lewis’ model of economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. 
Consequently, the labour surplus has been rising rather than declining during most of 
the post-transition period. But the problem appears to be not so much the shift away 
from labour-intensive production as it is an economic growth rate lower than that 
required to accelerate labour absorption. 
Recent developments in the labour market have not affected all groups in society 
equally. Black workers experienced the second largest percentage increase in 
employment over the period 1995-2002,8 while white workers experienced the smallest 
increase. This trend can be partly attributed to the introduction of affirmative action 
policy. However, Bhorat (2004: 950) points out that the employment absorption rate 
was substantially higher for whites (55 per cent) than for blacks (28 per cent). This 
suggests that blacks joined the ranks of the unemployed in disproportionately large 
numbers. The cause of this perpetuation of racial inequality in the labour market can be 
traced to the interaction between the skills-biased nature of recent economic growth in 
South Africa and racial human capital stock: firms increasingly demand employees with 
high levels of education. Between 1995 and 2002, 64 per cent of individuals  
with tertiary education found work, contrasted with only 35 per cent of individuals with 
matric (high school) and a mere 14 per cent of individuals with incomplete secondary 
schooling (Bhorat 2004: 951). White workers remain best positioned in the competition 
for scarce employment in the South African economy, given their historically superior 
access to education. In 2004, white labourforce participants had an average of 12.4 
years of schooling, compared with a much lower average of 8.6 years for black 
                                                 
6  Skilled labour accounted for 11 per cent of employment in 2002, while semiskilled labour accounted 
for 61 per cent in the same year (Bhorat 2003: 13). 
7  This calculation is made using the expanded definition of unemployment. 
8 Asians experienced the largest increase in employment (Bhorat 2003: 10). 
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labourforce participants.9 Simkins (1998) describes this ongoing disparity as one of the 
most enduring ‘footprints’ of apartheid.  
Amongst the (predominantly black) individuals who have borne the losses from the 
structural change associated with recent globalization, those who live in rural areas have 
been particularly hard hit. Instead of surviving on a purely agricultural basis, rural 
households in South Africa typically rely on a combination of remittances from urban 
areas and own access to land-based natural resources (including grazing rights, water, 
and wood). Indeed, only 5 per cent of household income in the former homelands is 
generated by subsistence production (Van der Berg 2004: 218). Members of 
impoverished rural households are at a particular disadvantage regarding access to 
education given the small number and often poor quality of schools in these areas. As a 
result of this lack of education and skill, they have been severely hit by the drop in 
unskilled employment in urban areas. On the other hand, the rural poor in South Africa 
are affected less by agricultural price shocks and changes in production associated with 
international competition than are the rural poor in other African countries, owing to the 
relatively low reliance of the former on agriculture for survival (Van der Berg 2004: 
221). Indeed, simulations performed by Dieden et al. (2005) confirm that the adverse 
impact of trade liberalization on the poor has been relatively small, with the bulk of 
modelled job losses affecting workers in the middle of the income distribution.  
The discussion above paints a picture in terms of which South Africans in the upper 
range of the income distribution appear to have reaped most of the gains to 
globalization—at least insofar as conditions in the labour market have evolved. 
However, research by Edwards (2001b) suggests that the most significant factors 
driving recent changes in the labour market are not directly linked to trade. This author 
employed an input-output decomposition to identify the determinants of changing 
employment over the early liberalizing years, 1993-97. Edwards (2001b: 55) finds that 
increasing domestic final demand expanded employment by 10 per cent during the 
period, while technological change caused a contraction in employment of 15 per cent. 
Net trade had a positive but very modest impact on employment, boosting it by only 
1 per cent over the five-year period. Interestingly, the strongest driver of the observed 
change in the skills composition in the workforce over this period appeared to be 
technological change, rather than trade. Of course, it may be convincingly argued that 
changes in technology represent a response by domestic suppliers to the challenges 
associated with liberalization in domestic product markets. In this way trade 
liberalization has indirectly benefited affluent, highly skilled workers at the expense of 
poor, low skilled workers.  
3 Trends in poverty, inequality and polarization 
The discussion has focused predominantly on the impact of recent liberalization on 
labour up to this point, given that wages constitute approximately two thirds of 
household income in South Africa (Leibbrandt, Woolard and Bhorat 2001: 30). It has 
been argued that globalization-related developments in the labour market have tended to 
favour better skilled workers, and would thus have exacerbated inequality, ceteris 
                                                 
9 These calculations are based on the LFS September 2004.  
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paribus. However, globalization may also have impacted on the South African income 
distribution through other mechanisms. In particular, the rising share of property income 
in household income is likely to be driving increased inequality. At the same time, 
rising economic growth rates (particularly in more recent years) have allowed for a 
concerted response from the government to the problem of ongoing widespread poverty. 
The poverty alleviation that has occurred has largely been achieved through expanding 
the social grant system, which has acted to reduce poverty and counter increases in 
inequality associated with recent structural trends.  
To investigate these issues further, we draw on the results of empirical analysis. First, 
conventional measures of poverty and inequality are presented, along with stochastic 
dominance curves that test the robustness of poverty findings. In this subsection, 
attention is focused mostly on discerning reliable trends in poverty over the past decade, 
given the controversial findings of several recent studies on the topic. An assessment of 
poverty trends during an era of re-integration into the global economy is also of 
particular interest in the context of the globalization focus, even if accepting that the 
causal relationship cannot be clearly established empirically. Following this exercise, a 
closer look is taken at South Africa’s unequal income distribution through the lens of 
polarization analysis. It is then asked whether re-integration has been accompanied by 
any change in the degree of polarization in an already highly economically polarized 
society. 
3.1 Distributional analysis 
Given the problems associated with comparing income data from the post-transition sets 
of censuses or income and expenditure surveys10 as well as a desire to extend the 
analysis beyond 2001, it was decided instead to draw data from the all media and 
products survey (AMPS).11 This survey is conducted once or twice a year under the 
auspices of the South African Advertising Research Foundation. For the purposes of 
this research, unit data records for the variables of interest were obtained for the period 
1993 to 2004. Each dataset contains approximately 25,000 observations, each relating to 
one individual who provided data for every household sampled. Before utilizing the 
AMPS datasets for distributional analysis, these were tested extensively for stability. 
Encouragingly, per capita incomes calculated from the data for the race groups deviated 
only once in 48 cases (four race groups times 12 years in which growth rates could be 
calculated) by more than 10 per cent from that in the previous year, indicating that data 
differences were not driven by large fluctuations caused by sampling and fieldwork 
questions in different years. Gini coefficients calculated for each race group were even 
more stable.  
Before turning to the analysis of poverty trends, a brief overview of intra-racial 
inequality is provided. The trends in racial Gini coefficients in Figure 3 show increasing 
inequality of incomes over the period as a whole for each of the four race groups, 
consistent with most findings of rising within-group inequality in the literature. 
                                                 
10  See Van der Berg et al. (2005) for a discussion of the hazards involved in a comparison of post-1994 
income distributions constructed from either of these datasets. 
11  A study by Van der Berg and Louw (2004) that followed a similar methodology used the IES data to 
obtain the intra-group distribution.  
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However, all race groups show individual deviations from this broad pattern, with the 
most surprising deviation being the declining Gini coefficient of the black population 
since 2000. This decline, together with the later decline of the Gini for the coloured 
population, is consistent with a scenario in which the expansion of grants and widening 
employment opportunities have benefited the poor more than proportionately. Since 
almost all of the poor belong to the black or coloured groups, these groups would have 
experienced the greatest inequality-reducing benefits of additional transfer income 
during recent years. The Gini coefficient measuring overall inequality (the net effect of 
both intra-group inequality and inequality between the race groups) is large but has 
remained quite stable over the period, implying that the effect of rising intraracial 
inequality has been offset to a large degree by the impact of a decline in interracial 
inequality. This is a continuation of a longer-term trend in the South African income 
distribution that started in the 1970s.  
Figure 3 
Estimated Gini coefficients, 1993-2004 
Source: Own estimates based on AMPS data for various years. 
Table 1 
Selected indicators of poverty 
(poverty line set at R3,000 per capita per year in 2000 rand values 
 1993 2000 2004 
    
P0 (Headcount ratio) 0.50 0.51 0.47 
P1 (Poverty gap ratio) 0.24 0.25 0.22 
P2 (Squared poverty gap/Poverty severity ratio) 0.15 0.15 0.13 
Number of poor (million) 20.0 22.7 21.8 
Number of non-poor (million) 20.0 22.0 24.7 
Source: Computed by authors. 
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Figure 4 
Trends in poverty, 1993-2004 
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Source: Own estimates based on AMPS data for various years. 
The focus now shifts to determining whether poverty has improved or worsened since 
political transition. Here, following Van der Berg and Louw (2004), the poverty line is 
set at R250 household income per month or R3,000 per year in 2000 rand 
(approximately US$4 per capita per day in 2002 PPP dollars), somewhat above the two 
dollar a day often used by the World Bank. The poverty line is a conservative measure 
in the sense that it will identify those living in relatively deep poverty, although it is 
judged to be high enough to act as a relatively realistic identifier of poverty. Stochastic 
dominance testing is used to determine the robustness of our conclusions to the 
specification of poverty line, given that the choice of poverty line is fairly arbitrary by 
construction. For purposes of measuring poverty, the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measures 
are employed: the poverty headcount (P0) reflects the extent of poverty, the poverty gap 
index (P1) reflects the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap index (P2) reflects 
the severity of poverty.  
Table 1 reveals that the headcount poverty rate and poverty gap index increased slightly 
over the first part of the period covered, and declined to below their starting levels 
towards the end of the period covered. The poverty severity ratio remained stable 
between 1993 and 2000, also dropping after the turn of the century. The proportion of 
people living in poverty increased over 1993-2000, probably as a result of sluggish 
economic growth and poor labour market prospects. However, in more recent years the 
proportion of poor people appears to have declined substantially, possibly due to a 
combination of faster growth, better labour market prospects and large-scale expansion 
of the social grant system. A similar trend applies in terms of the poverty headcount 
(i.e., the absolute number of people living in poverty), although the number of people 
living in poverty in 2004 was larger than in 1993 as a result of population growth. The 
trends in poverty drawn from the analysis on AMPS data are illustrated in Figure 4.  
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The speed at which poverty appears to have declined since 2002 is striking, and may be 
challenged as being the result of quirks in the AMPS data. To answer such claims, the 
issue is investigated further:  
— The impact of the recent expansion of social grants on the poor is likely to 
have been major, considering that real transfers from the government increased 
by some R22 billion in the last two years (in 2000 rand), an amount well in 
excess of R1,000 per poor person. Bear in mind that poverty is defined as 
income of less than R3,000 per capita per year in this paper. The grants are 
supposed to be targeted through the means test, thus most of the additional R22 
billion flows into poor households. Considering that the income of the poor 
was only R27 billion in 2000, an increase of such magnitude in social grants 
makes a great difference to the poor and may lift many of them out of poverty, 
if it is well targeted. 
— The national accounts show that real remuneration rose by R53 billion between 
2002 and 2004, representing an exceptionally large increase by South African 
standards of 11.7 per cent over this period. This must have had a strongly 
positive influence on the incomes of many of the poor, either through higher 
wages or through increased employment. 
— Income distribution, particularly in the black population, is relatively clustered 
around the poverty line. This means that small shifts in the distribution could 
have large impacts on poverty. The poverty consequences of distributional 
shifts are particularly severe if black incomes change, given the size of this 
group and the observed clustering of black incomes near the poverty line. 
Thus, the impact of grants on poverty is strongest if grants contribute 
predominantly to black incomes.  
The finding that poverty has fallen during the post-transition period stands in direct 
contrast with the arguments made in several recent studies, including those authored by 
Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) and Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2005). These 
papers argue that the extent of poverty has risen strongly during the post-transition 
period. However, there is reason to believe that the datasets on which these analyses are 
based (and particularly the IESs) are not directly comparable. The interested reader is 
referred to Van der Berg et al. (2005) for a discussion of the issues affecting the validity 
of inference drawn from a comparison of these household datasets. Moreover, the 
period covered by these studies ends before the major decline in poverty observed in 
this paper, and before the full expansion of social grant spending that largely brought 
this poverty reduction about.  
Finally, the sensitivity of findings to the specification of a poverty line is tested using 
cumulative density functions (CDFs). In each of the CDF graphs, a vertical line is 
plotted at the level at which the poverty line is drawn, i.e., R3,000 per person per year. 
The CDFs are plotted with alternately income and the log of income on the horizontal 
axis—the latter allows one to get a better overview of the whole distribution. Figures 
5(a) and 5(b) show that there is poverty dominance in 2004 relative to either of the other 
years shown, i.e., that poverty was lower in terms of extent, depth and severity in 2004 
than in either of the preceding years. This finding is independent of the choice of 
poverty line or of the scale chosen (that is, income or the log thereof).  
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 Figure 5(a) Figure 5(b) 
 Poverty dominance testing Poverty dominance testing 
 (Scale: real per capita income) (Scale: log real per capita income) 
 
 
Source: Computed by authors. 
In summary, a robust trend of declining poverty has emerged from the empirical 
analysis. It appears that government action to address poverty through social grants has 
been the most important contributor to poverty alleviation, although the improved 
employment trend may indicate that employment growth is now on course towards a 
greater sustainable reduction in poverty. This represents an improvement on the initially 
weak job-creating performance of the economy during the first few years after re-
entering the world economy. 
The flipside of declining poverty is a rise in the number of non-poor, as reflected in 
Table 1. In particular, a swelling black middle class has emerged as one of the most 
interesting distributional phenomena in recent years. Growth in black per capita 
incomes during the last two years has been very rapid, due inter alia to: 
— An acceleration in aggregate black remuneration as a result of the improved 
performance of the economy in creating jobs. For the long-term sustainability 
of poverty reduction, further trends of this nature are essential. It is too early to 
determine whether the increased job creation indicates that the job shedding 
reaction of many firms in adjusting to international competition has completed 
its course.  
— The rapid growth of transfer income from the government driven by the 
expansion of the CSG, increased uptake of other grants (particularly disability 
grants), and higher benefits; 
— An increasing share of transfer income for the blacks, with the initially slow 
uptake of the CSG in rural areas having yielded to very rapid expansion; 
— Slowdown in population growth amongst blacks, which has also meant that the 
gains from a growing overall income share of blacks have been spread 
amongst a smaller population, raising per capita incomes as a result. 
In Figure 6, estimates of black workers likely to form part of the middle and upper 
classes is presented, both in terms of numbers of people and the black proportion of the 
total constituting this socioeconomic grouping. OHS and LFS data are used for this 
exercise, and middle and upper earners are identified as those workers earning at least 
R6,000 per month (2000 rand values) from their main job. As can be seen, the number 
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of black workers who are well established in the labour market has increased 
substantially since 2003. Indeed, approximately 150,000 black workers joined these 
ranks between 1995 and 2005. In addition, the proportion of the total well-earning 
subpopulation accounted for by the blacks has also risen recently.  
Figure 6 
Black middle- and upper-income earners 
 
0 
100000 
200000 
300000 
400000 
500000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a 2000b 2001a 2001b 2002a 2002b 2003a 2003b 2004a 2004b 2005a 2005b 0 
0.05
0.1 
0.15
0.2 
0.25
0.3 
0.35
Affluent blacks - number Black share of affluent class
 
Source: Own estimates based on OHS/LFS data for various years. 
3.3 Polarization analysis 
The paper examines trends in polarization as a supplement to the poverty and inequality 
analysis. As Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and Wolfson (1997) demonstrate, 
polarization is a concept that is both theoretically and empirically distinct from 
inequality.12 Wolfson (1997) and Seshanna and Decornez (2003) argue that polarization 
indicators are best suited for describing the distributional trends over which the public 
and media appear to be most concerned about. As Seshanna and Decornez (2003) 
suggest, polarization captures the ‘sharpening of the divide’ between income classes. 
According to Esteban and Ray (1994), a shortcoming of many of the conventional 
inequality indicators is that they do not reflect increases in the ‘tightness’ of clustering 
around local means.  
These polarization measures are interesting in their own right. They reflect social 
integration more precisely and are thus better predictors of social stability than 
inequality measures. They can identify changes in social organization such as increased 
fracturing and marginalization, which often would not be reflected in inequality 
                                                 
12  Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) show, for instance, that for a sample of 21 countries, the polarization 
measure yields country rankings that are vastly different from the rankings based on the size of the 
Gini coefficient. 
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indicators. Given the evidence that these measures generally produce rankings and trend 
lines that are distinct and even at odds with those produced using inequality indicators, 
the authors consider it vital to supplement the inequality and poverty analysis with an 
investigation of shifts in polarization in South Africa over the last ten years.  
Polarization analysis is applied here to two series of datasets. To measure polarization 
trends for household income, we use the IES datasets for 1995 and 2000. (The AMPS 
data are not ideal for this purpose since this survey captures household income data in 
intervals.) The paper also examines polarization trends in wage income for individuals, 
using the OHS and LFS household surveys available from 1995 to 2005. Note that the 
OHS for 1996 is excluded from the analysis since incomes are reported in intervals, 
rendering this data unsuitable for calculation of polarization indices.  
In the economics literature, two polarization measures are frequently used: the Wolfson 
index (1994) and the Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) polarization measure (hereafter 
referred to as the D-E-R measure). The D-E-R polarization indicator was designed to 
capture changes in clustering around a number of local means. It measures both the 
tightness of these identified groups and their distance from other data points, assuming 
that there are two vital factors underlying polarization: alienation and identification. The 
authors argue that a sense of detachment is not all that matters; the sense of togetherness 
and belonging within the isolated groups is a crucial factor to consider since this is 
expected to be correlated with the likelihood of social mobilization and action. 
Consequently, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) describe the polarization index as the 
sum of all ‘effective antagonism’ in a society.  
The alienation between two points is measured by the distance between the points, 
while the identification metric is captured by the density of observations at the point of 
interest. In this paper both the alienation of and identification among individuals are 
measured in terms of income. The algorithm suggested by Duclos, Esteban and Ray is: 
dydxxyyfxffP −≡ ∫∫ + )()()( 1 αα .  
where [ ]1,25.0∈α . 
In the work reported below, the polarization-sensitivity parameter, α , is set to 1. This 
parameter determines the power of the identification effect. When α  = 0, the index 
reduces to double the Gini coefficient. Changes in polarization can be attributed to 
changes in alienation (distance between incomes) and identification (densities at 
populated points), as well as to co-movements between these two dimensions; for 
instance, whether density increases have been at points that are far removed or near to 
other incomes. Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) explain that more variation and 
‘spikiness’ are associated with higher polarization.  
The Wolfson index is a bi-polarization index that can be used to detect trends in the 
divergence of incomes or the so-called ‘vanishing middle-class’. This index studies 
clustering around two extreme poles and is thus distinct from the D-E-R index that 
investigates the ‘tightness’ of observations around a number of prominent ‘lumps’ in the 
income distribution.  
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where Q is the quantile function, I2 is the Gini index and L is the Lorenz curve. 
In Table 2, the calculated values of the D-E-R polarization index for household income 
per capita between 1995 and 2000 are reported, with α  set to 1. The most striking 
aspect of Table 2 is undoubtedly the high level of polarization suggested by the index 
values. For α  set to 1, household per capita polarization is 0.19 and 0.20 in 1995 and 
2000 respectively. If South Africa had to be inserted into the D-E-R polarization 
ranking based on either of these two polarizations estimates, it would achieve the 
second highest position out of 22, placed after Russia and before Mexico.13 The D-E-R 
ranking is based on the fourth wave of the Luxembourg Income Study. 
With respect to trends, the calculations in Table 2 show that there was a modest increase 
in overall income polarization between 1995 and 2000. The D-E-R index was also 
calculated separately for each of the population groups. The within-race polarization 
calculations reveal that the trend on the aggregate level may be fuelled by the strong 
increase in income polarization among blacks. As might be expected given the high 
income inequality within this group, the level of polarization is highest among blacks. 
Due to a strong increase in income polarization within this group, the substantial racial 
gap in levels of polarization widened further between 1995 and 2000.  
Over this period, income polarization increased in urban areas, but decreased in rural 
areas. In 1995 income polarization was more or less the same in urban and rural areas. 
Following the strong increase in polarization in urban areas, observe that polarization 
was higher in urban than in rural areas by 2000. 
Table 2 
Polarization trends for household income per capita, 1995 to 2000 
 (Duclos, Esteban and Ray index) 
Survey IES 1995 IES 2000 
   
n=29 586 n=26 142 All 
0.1912 0.2049 
Blacks 0.1398 0.1923 
Coloured 0.1088 0.1180 
Race 
Indian 0.0998 0.0933 
 White 0.0952 0.0914 
Urban 0.1447 0.1693 Area 
Rural 0.1535 0.1309 
Source: Computed by authors. 
                                                 
13  To make our calculated index values more comparable with the estimates of Duclos, Esteban and Ray 
(2004), we follow them by dividing the estimates by two. Note that the resulting index values are still 
not entirely comparable because Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) use post-tax income normalized by 
an adult equivalence scale. 
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Figure 7 
Trends in wage income polarization, 1995-2005 
(Duclos, Esteban and Ray index) 
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Source: Own estimates based on OHS/LFS data for various years. 
Figure 7 indicates that between 1995 and 2000 the polarization of individual wage 
income declined, while household income polarization has increased. Comparable 
trends are observed for the separate race groups. After 2000, wage polarization rose 
beyond 1995 levels. As argued before, it is impossible to attribute these trends to any 
one specific event, although the results are consistent with strong unions and increased 
labour market regulation. Given the household income polarization results, it is not 
surprising that wage polarization is shown to be the highest among blacks.  
It is clear that the D-E-R and Wolfson indices measure different types of polarization. 
Using the same data, the Wolfson polarization index suggests a considerable decline in 
household income polarization between 1995 and 2000. This trend is reflected in 
Table 3, contrasting starkly with the noted moderate increase in the D-E-R index over 
the same period. As mentioned before, the Wolfson index captures bi-polarization, 
while the D-E-R index detects alienation and clustering around several local means.  
Table 3 
Trends in Wolfson Bi-polarization index, 1995 to 2000 
 Household income per capita 
   
Survey IES 1995 IES 2000 
All 0.8548 0.6906 
Black 0.5839 0.5451 
Coloured 0.4697 0.5159 
Indian 0.3959 0.4820 
Race 
White 0.3585 0.3841 
Area Urban 0.7353 0.7241 
 Rural 0.5274 0.4526 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
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Figure 8 
Trends in wage income polarization, 19950-2005 
(Wolfson bi-polarization index) 
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Source: Own estimates based on OHS/LFS data for various years. 
The observed decline in income bi-polarization is indicative of an expanding middle-
class. If there is a bi-polarizing force at work due to the greater openness of economy, it 
appears that other factors, such as the impact of the expansion of social grants and the 
increased mobility of black workers in post-apartheid South Africa have countered it. 
This conjecture of two opposing forces is further supported by the strong rising trend of 
wage bi-polarization, following the large tariff reductions that occurred between 1990 
and 1996. In Figure 8 it is shown that this trend was reversed in 2000, with wage 
polarization starting to taper off again. Post-2000 wage polarization for the blacks has 
declined sharply and started to approach levels observed within other race groups.  
The fall in bi-polarization in black and rural incomes between 1995 and 2000 suggests 
that transfers may have played a role in softening the starkness of disparities in the 
overall income distribution. Between 1995 and 2000 rural wage polarization grew from 
0.60 to 0.81, while rural income polarization dropped from 0.53 to 0.45. However, some 
of the sharper changes observed here might be due to a deficiency in the comparability 
of the surveys. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed possible links between South Africa’s post-1994 globalization 
experience and the country’s income distribution by treating globalization as a triad of 
political change, financial liberalization and trade liberalization. It has thus evaluated 
the likely impacts on the income distribution of a modest improvement in the country’s 
economic growth prospects post-1994 and the implementation of the ANC-led 
government’s poverty alleviation policy. While the process of opening up to 
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international markets has not resulted in a structural switch towards jobless growth, it 
has been accompanied by rising unemployment and a skills bias in employment creation 
favouring better educated workers. Thus, in spite of yielding an estimated employment 
elasticity of economic growth of approximately 0.8 over the period 1993-2004, it is 
improbable that the labour market has been responsible for any substantial increase in 
the incomes of those near the lower end of the income distribution. By contrast, a boost 
of R22 billion (in 2000 rand) to social grant expenditures between 2002 and 2004 is 
highly likely to have improved the material position of the poor, who as a group 
received only R27 billion in the year 2000. 
A formal analysis of distributional trends shows a small increase in poverty between 
1993 and 2000, followed by a marked reduction in poverty. While the recent expansion 
of the social grant system is the main source of this improvement, at over 3 per cent of 
GDP it is currently nearing its poverty alleviation ceiling. With respect to inequality, 
ongoing substitution of interracial for intraracial inequality is observed, continuing an 
earlier trend. Amongst groups, blacks continue to experience the highest level of 
inequality, although a small reduction has been observed since the turn of the century. 
Estimation of two polarization indices complements the inequality analysis by 
highlighting the extent to which unequal income distribution may be undermining social 
and political stability. Although one measure—the D-E-R index—provides evidence of 
increasing ‘effective antagonism’ within South African society, another—the Wolfson 
index—suggests that the improvements in living conditions associated with expanding 
grants and the emergence of a black middle class have dampened to some degree the 
social tensions associated with material inequality. Importantly, given the caveats 
required in any discussion of recent achievements in reducing poverty and inequality in 
South Africa, addressing widespread poverty associated with unemployment and the 
possible consequences of ongoing high levels of inequality remain critical policy focus 
areas in this country. 
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